Will there ever be Court-Imposed Grandparent Visitation in Illinois after Wickham v. Byrne?

Posted on July 26, 2011 by mgoldberg
This entry was posted in Family Law Articles, Grandparent Visitation Articles. Bookmark the permalink.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Illinois Grandparent Visitation Act¹ was held facially unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court in April of 2002.² In the wake of that holding (a 6-1 vote) and the strong pro-parent language contained therein, there has been much debate as to whether a similar Act can or should be created. The new millennium has not been kind to Illinois grandparents seeking court-mandated visitation with their grandchildren, as courts-both state and federal-have consistently reduced their visitation rights.
First came the U.S. Supreme Court case of Troxel v. Granville ³ in which the Court made a rare decision to wade through the murky waters of family law long enough to determine that the Washington State third-party visitation statute was unconstitutional. The Court stopped well short of declaring all state grandparent visitation statutes unconstitutional, but the decision (a plurality) set the foundation for the Wickham holding, by stating that the wishes of a fit parent must be given deference regarding third-party visitation requests. Such deference was glaringly absent from the Illinois Act. (In fact 750 ILCS 607(b) (3), which that states that parents shall not interfere with the visitation rights of the grandparents, appears to create a presumption in favor of grandparent visitation.) Then in October of 2000, in Lulay v. Lulay ⁴, the Illinois Supreme Court held that state-mandated grandparent visitation as applied to the children of divorced parents, both of whom object to the visitation, was an unconstitutional infringement on the parents’ fundamental liberty interest in raising their children. The Lulay Court was not asked to determine whether the Grandparent Visitation Act was facially constitutional, and therefore left that issue open for another day. That day came on April 18, 2002, when the Illinois Supreme Court decided Wickham. That decision placed the final nail into the coffin of the Grandparent Visitation Act, and could arguably have signaled the end of court-mandated grandparent visitation in Illinois.
The Grandparent Visitation Act was not created in a vacuum; it was a legislative reaction to such phenomena as double income families, single parent homes and other variations of the traditional concept of the American family. Persons outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to take part in the tasks of child rearing. The 2000 census revealed a pertinent, and somewhat startling statistic: 40% of the households in Illinois list grandparents as the primary caregivers for their children.⁵ Nationwide enactment of child visitation statutes-such as the Illinois Act- is certainly due to such changing realities of the American family. The legislative history of the Illinois Grandparent Visitation Act indicates that the erosion of the traditional nuclear family was a key factor that led to its creation. Before Wickham , when grandparents were suddenly denied visitation with the children with whom they had previously enjoyed visitation, litigation often ensued. Post- Wickham, it is likely that groups such as American Association of Retired Persons will push for a revised third-party visitation act. However, it is by no means clear that such attempts will prove successful in light of Wickham Court’s strong endorsement of the sanctity of a fit parent’s right to determine how to raise his or her children.
This Article will examine the Illinois Grandparent Visitation Act and the two cases that must be overcome- Wickham and Troxel- by any lawmaker who decides to introduce a similar Act. Also reviewed are several other state Supreme Court grandparent visitation cases, to be used as a barometer (along with Wickham and Troxel) for the future of court-imposed grandparent visitation in Illinois. Finally, the article will suggest language that should be included in any future Illinois Grandparent Visitation Act.
II. WICKHAM AND THE ILLINOIS GRANDPARENT VISITATION ACT
A. The following sections of the Illinois Grandparent Visitation Act have been ruled facially unconstitutional:
“The court may grant reasonable visitation privileges to a grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling of any minor child upon petition to the court by the grandparents or great-grandparents or on behalf of the sibling, with notice to the parties required to be notified under Section 601 of this Act, if the court determines that it is in the best interests and welfare of the child, and may issue any necessary orders to enforce such visitation privileges…if one or more of the following circumstances exist:
(A) the parents are not currently cohabiting on a permanent or an indefinite basis;
(B) one of the parents has been absent from the marital abode for more than one month without the spouse knowing his or her whereabouts;
(C) one of the parents is deceased;
(D) one of the parents joins in the petition with the grandparents, great-grandparents, or sibling; or
(E) a sibling is in State custody….
(3) When one parent is deceased, the surviving parent shall not interfere with the visitation rights of the grandparents.”⁶

B. Legislative history of the Act
Prior to the legislature’s enactment of section 607(b)(1) , Illinois common law provided no visitation rights to grandparents unless there was a showing of “special circumstances.” In Chodzko v. Chodzko ⁷, for example, the circuit court of Cook County allowed a maternal grandfather to intervene in the divorce proceeding between his daughter and her husband and receive visitation privileges with his grandchildren over the objection of the mother. The Supreme Court reversed the order granting visitation on the basis that the grandfather’s petition contained no allegations to support a conclusion that either parent was unfit or had forfeited the superior right to the custody and care of the children.⁸
Moreover, the court in Chodzko stated:
“No special circumstances have been established that would warrant granting special visitation rights to the grandfather. It is commendable that a bond of love and affection, as alleged, exists between the grandfather and the minor children; however, this and the allegation of past favors do not justify carving out of the custody and visitation rights of the natural parents still another visitation right and vesting it in the grandfather.”⁹

The Act was codified to recognize a grandparent’s right to seek visitation after the parent’s divorce.¹⁰ Less than one year after the provision’s enactment, it was amended to provide grandparents a right to seek visitation privileges if one of the parents died.11 In 1985, the provision was again amended to allow for visitation privileges when the child had been adopted by the surviving parent or the custodial parent’s spouse.¹² In 1989, during what must have been a particularly influential period for groups like the American Association of Retired Persons, the provision was amended once more, allowing grandparents to seek visitation privileges regardless of whether the family was still intact.¹³ This Pandora’s box was wisely closed less than one year after becoming the law.¹⁴
C. The Wickham Court finds the Grandparent Visitation Act facially unconstitutional.

1. The Facts¹⁵

Paul Byrne lost his wife to a terminal illness less than a year after their daughter was born. After his wife’s death, Paul agreed to maintain the relationship between his wife’s mother, Virginia Wickham and the child, often driving the child 50 minutes to Virginia’s home for visits. Virginia, however, wanted more time with her granddaughter and asked Paul for unsupervised overnight visitation. Paul felt that overnight visitation was inappropriate, but agreed to continue to drive his daughter to Virginia’s home when his schedule permitted. Unable to convince Paul to let the child (less than 2 yeas old at the time) stay at her house overnight, Virginia filed a petition in the circuit of Cook County for grandparent visitation under 750 ILCS 607 (b) (1).¹⁶
After the hearing on the petition for visitation, the trial court denied overnight visitation, and ordered supervised visitation with the child at Paul’s home for four hours a week. Following the hearing, Paul filed a motion to dismiss the petition, which was denied. Paul then filed an application for an interlocutory appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308, which was also denied.¹⁷ The Illinois Supreme Court granted Paul’s petition for leave to appeal.¹⁸
2. The Wickham holding; the best interest standard is not enough.
The Wickham Court found sections 607(b)(1) and (3) unconstitutional on their face, stating that no set of circumstances exist under which the Act would be valid. The Court determined that the issue involved in Wickham, visitation with grandparents, did not involve a threat to the health, safety or welfare of the children. The Court listed examples of “limited instances” that would justify state interference with parental child rearing rights such as: testing for phenylketonuria at birth (410 ILCS 240/1 (West 2000)); required immunization for diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (410 ILCS 315/2 (West 2000)); required hearing and visual examinations (410 ILCS 205/1 et seq. (West 2000)); and prohibited child labor (820 ILCS 205/1 et seq. (West 2000)). The Court ruled that grandparent visitation disputes do not rise to the level of concern for the health, safety and welfare of children as do such issues as required vaccinations.
The Wickham Court recognized that in most cases, the relationship between a child and his or her grandparents is a nurturing, loving relationship that provides a vital connection to the family’s history and roots.
However, the Court stated:
“[A]s with all human relationships, conflicts may arise between a child’s parents and grandparents. In many cases, this conflict will concern disagreements about how a parent is raising his or her children. Yet, this human conflict has no place in the courtroom. This is true even where the intrusion is made in good conscience, such as the request for visitation to preserve the child’s only connection to a deceased parent’s family. Parents have the constitutionally protected latitude to raise their children as they decide, even if these decisions are perceived by some to be for arbitrary or wrong reasons. The presumption that parents act in their children’s best interest prevents the court from second guessing parents’ visitation decisions. Moreover, a fit parent’s constitutionally protected liberty interest to direct the care, custody, and control of his or her children mandates that parents-not judges-should be the ones to decide with whom their children will and will not associate.”

The Wickham Court found a “flaw” in the Grandparent Visitation Act since-similar to the Washington statute at issue in Troxel- it permitted visitation if it was determined by the court to be in the best interests and welfare of the child, placing the parent on equal footing with the party seeking visitation rights.¹⁹ Frequently, lawyers for the grandparents have directed courts to look to 750 ILCS 602 (best interest criteria for visitation issues between parents) for guidance, but visitation battles between parents are different than those between a parent and grandparent(s), and 602 simply fails to provide courts with adequate guidance to decide grandparent visitation disputes. Moreover, the absence of a best interest provision in 750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1) requiring a court to favor a parent’s wishes regarding visitation or to require a showing that the parent is somehow not fit to make such a decision contradicts the Troxel Court, which found the lack of such criteria pivotal in its ruling, since it determined that a trial court must presume that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.²⁰

III. TROXEL V. GRANVILLE

In the post-Wickham world, Illinois practitioners and/or legislators seeking to amend the Grandparent Visitation Act must, in addition to reviewing the Wickham decision, look to Troxel for guidance.
A. The Troxel facts

The parents in Troxel, who were never married, had two children. While the parents were living together, the father regularly brought the children to visit with his parents. However, the father committed suicide in May of 1993. Although at first after their son’s death, the Troxels continued to see their grandchildren on a regular basis, by October 1993 the mother informed the Troxels that she wished to limit their visitation with the children to one short visit per month. The grandparents filed a visitation petition soon thereafter.²¹ At trial, the grandparents requested two weekends of overnight visitation per month and two weeks of visitation each summer.²² The trial court granted them visitation one weekend per month, one week during the summer and four hours on both of the petitioning grandparents’ birthdays.²³ The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s visitation order on the basis that non-parents lack standing to seek visitation under section 26.10.160(3) unless a custody action is pending. The Washington Supreme Court held that section 26.10.160(3) is an unconstitutional infringement on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children. Specifically, the court found that the statute is too broad because it allows “any person” to petition for forced visitation with the child “at any time” with the only requirement being that the visitation serve the best interest of the child.²⁴ The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1999.²⁵
B. The Supreme Court’s decision
While the U.S. Supreme Court was concerned that under the Washington Statute “any person” may petition the court for visitation,²⁶ they also found fault with the statute for failing to take into consideration and give deference to the parent’s estimation of the child’s best interest.²⁷ Furthermore, the Court ruled that 26.10.160 (3) exceeds the bounds of the Due Process Clause because it does not require a showing that the parent is unfit. The Court determined that there is a presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best interests.²⁸
In a perfect world, parents and grandparents would always agree about the nature and duration of visits with the grandchildren. However, in the real world fit parents and grandparents often drastically disagree on important details of visitation. In the Troxel decision, the Court stated that, when such disputes arise, the trial court must accord at least some special weight to the parent’s determination.²⁹ In her Opinion, Justice O’Connor listed the current state visitation statutes that contain presumptions in favor of the parent: Cal. Fam.Code Ann. 3104(e) (West 1994) (rebuttable presumption that grandparent visitation is not in child’s best interest if parents agree that visitation rights should not be granted); Me.Rev.Stat. Ann., Tit. 19A, 1803(3) (1998) (court may award grandparent visitation if it is in the best interest of the child and “would not significantly interfere with any parent-child relationship or with the parent’s rightful authority over the child”); Minn.Stat. 257.022(2)(a)(2) (1998) (court may award grandparent visitation if it is in the best interest of the child and “such visitation would not interfere with the parent-child relationship”); Neb.Rev.Stat. 43- 1802(2) (1998) (court must find “by clear and convincing evidence” that grandparent visitation “will not adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship”); R.I. Gen. Laws 15-5-24.3(a)(2)(v) (Supp.1999) (grandparent must rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, presumption that parent’s decision to refuse grandparent visitation was reasonable); Utah Code Ann. 30-5-2(2)(e) (1998) (same); Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291-292 (N.D.1999) (holding North Dakota grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional because State has no “compelling interest in presuming visitation rights of grandparents to an unmarried minor are in the child’s best interests and forcing parents to accede to court-ordered grandparental visitation unless the parents are first able to prove such visitation is not in the best interests of their minor child”).³⁰
C. Due process and fundamental rights cases cited in Troxel
The Troxel Court wrote that the liberty interest at issue –the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children–is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), the Court held that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the education of their own.” Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), they again held that the “liberty of parents and guardians” includes the right “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.” The Court explained in Pierce that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” The Court returned to the subject in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944), and again confirmed that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court found it significant in Troxel that the surviving parent never sought to cut off visitation entirely. In its decision, the Court took note that other states expressly provide by statute that courts may not award visitation unless a parent has denied (or unreasonably denied) visitation to the concerned third party.³¹ The following statutes were listed by the Court: Miss.Code Ann. 93-16-3(2)(a) (1994) (court must find that “the parent or custodian of the child unreasonably denied the grandparent visitation rights with the child”); Ore.Rev.Stat. 109.121(1)(a)(B) (1997) (court may award visitation if the “custodian of the child has denied the grandparent reasonable opportunity to visit the child”); R.I. Gen. Laws 15-5-24.3(a)(2)(iii)-(iv) (Supp.1999) (court must find that parents prevented grandparent from visiting grandchild and that “there is no other way the petitioner is able to visit his or her grandchild without court intervention”).³²
While the Court stopped short of publishing a ruling in Troxel which could be uniformly applied to any of the 50 state statutes concerning grandparent visitation, the Court did provide enough insight into their reasoning in that decision to provide the Illinois Courts and Legislature with some important clues to drafting a revised Illinois Grandparent Visitation Act.
IV. IS THERE A FUTURE FOR GRANDPARENT VISITATION IN ILLINOIS?
A. Other State Supreme Court Cases
The Florida Supreme Court, which sits in the state where one would think elderly citizens would receive the most liberal treatment, has struck two fatal blows to its State grandparent visitation statute.³³ This second decision regarding Florida’s Grandparent Visitation Act, in sum, equates to its complete dismantling based upon its unconstitutionality. In its first decision, the Florida Supreme Court struck down that portion of the statute, which permitted grandparent visitation in an intact family.³⁴ In the second case, Von Eiff, the Florida Supreme Court was confronted with that portion of the statute, which permitted grandparent visitation where one of the parents is deceased. Florida Supreme Court went on to state:
“We find nothing in the unfortunate circumstances of one biological parent’s death that would affect the surviving parents right of privacy in a parenting decision concerning the child’s contact with her maternal grandparents. Philip Von Eiff, whom the trial court found to be a “loving, nurturing and fit” parent continues to enjoy a right of privacy in his parenting decisions despite the death of the child’s biological mother.” Id.

Furthermore, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, found its state grandparent visitation statute to be unconstitutional “under the existing facts” of that case.³⁵ The Herbst court held that the Oklahoma grandparent visitation statute explicitly violated the federal constitutional rights afforded the parents to the companionship, care, custody and management of their child. Id. There, the parties were living together as an intact family. Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the state’s interest in a child is “implicated upon a finding of harm to the child… or of the custodial parent’s unfitness.” Id. “Without the requisite harm or unfitness, the state’s interest does not rise to a level so compelling as to warrant intrusion upon the fundamental rights of parents.”
The Oklahoma Supreme Court relied heavily on the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Brooks vs. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189, 454 S.E. 2d 769 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1995). In Brooks , the Supreme Court of Georgia struck down the entire grandparent visitation statute as violative of the parents’ rights under the Federal Constitution. Id. It held that “state interference with parental rights to custody and control of children is permissible only where the health and welfare of a child is threatened.” Id. The Georgia Supreme Court held that its statute fell short because it failed “to require a showing of harm before visitation can be ordered.”
In Skov v. Wicker 32 P.3d 1122; 2001 Kan. LEXIS 611 (2001) the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in holding that its grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court found that on remand the grandmother and great-grandparents had the burden of proving that visitation was in the child’s best interest and that a substantial relationship with the grandchildren existed. The Court stated in addition, that the trial court must give special weight to the fundamental presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interests of his or her child
The Maine Supreme court held in Rideout v. Riendeau 2000 ME 198; 761 A.2d 291; 2000 Me. LEXIS 206 (2000), that the Maine grandparent visitation statute was narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interest of addressing children’s relationship with people who had cared for them as parents, and thus did not violate Due Process Clause or constitutional rights of parents, where grandparents had acted as parents for significant periods of time. The Court reasoned that cessation of contact with a grandparent whom a child viewed as a parent could have had a dramatic, even traumatic, effect on the child, giving the State a compelling interest in providing grandparents with such a relationship with a forum to seek contact, holding Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, § 1803(1) (B), which required a “sufficient existing relationship” between grandparent and child, could have been applied in a manner consistent with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
At issue in Linder v. Linder 2002 Ark. LEXIS 239 (April 25, 2002) was the constitutionality of the Arkansas Grandparental Visitation Act, codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-103 (Repl. 2002). Even though the Act gives no presumption to the parent’s wishes, and even thought it procedurally favors the granting of grandparental visitation, and, thus, implicitly shifts the burden of proof to the parent, the Arkansas Supreme Court refused to find the Act facially unconstitutional, but did rule that it was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case.
B. Necessary language
A review of Wickham, Troxel and the other state supreme court cases dealing with grandparent visitation indicates that to withstand a constitutional attack, any future grandparent visitation statute in Illinois should include, at a minimum, the following provisions:
1. Presumption that a parent is fit and a presumption that a fit parent’s decision regarding grandparent visitation are in the child’s best interest.
2. Visitation must only be ordered when the child’s health, safety or welfare is at risk. In other words lack of visitation with the grandparents, or the difference between the visitation the custodial parent has offered and the visitation the grandparents seek, has caused or will imminently cause substantial identifiable harm to the child.
3. The grandparents must establish a substantial relationship with the child and demonstrate that the length and quality of the prior relationship warrant continued visitation.
4. The grandparent is unreasonably denied visitation with the child.
5. Child’s activities and family events must supercede visitation scheduling, and visitation must not materially harm the parent-child relationship.

C. Conclusion
While Wickham unambiguously supported a parent’s right to raise his or her children without interference from the state unless the health, safety or welfare of the children are at issue; Troxel left open as many questions as it answered. Neither decision provides a complete blueprint for a visitation act that would withstand constitutional muster. Significantly, the vast majority of the states have viable grandparent visitation statutes³⁶, and it is a good bet that a new version of 607 (b)(1) will be proposed to the Illinois Legislature. The former Act gave no deference to a parent’s wishes and allowed the state to inject itself into the private realm of the family, absent a showing that a parent is unfit or that there is some harm that will befall the child. As indicated by the Troxel and Wickham Courts these omissions were fatal to the Act’s survival, since it contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child. A review of recent state supreme court cases involving grandparent visitation indicates that a fit parent must be given deference and that a more stringent standard than “best interest” must be invoked before visitation will be ordered. Absent a finding that a child’s welfare is at issue i.e. physical abuse, malnutrition or other neglect, the state should not substitute its opinion regarding visitation for that of the fit parent. Now that the U.S. and Illinois Supreme Courts have spoken on the issue of grandparent visitation, it is time to sharpen our pencils and try to craft a visitation statute that comports with a parent’s fundamental right to raise his or her child.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Michael K. Goldberg is an associate at the Chicago law firm of Goldberg & Frankenstein, LLC, where he concentrates in general civil litigation including family law matters. Michael argued before the Illinois Supreme Court inWickham on behalf of Mr. Byrne. He also represents physicians and other professionals who are before the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, as well as physicians in hospital peer review and privileging matters. Before joining Goldberg & Frankenstein, LLC, Michael worked for five years as an Assistant State’s Attorney for Cook County. He can be reached at (312) 930-5600 or at mgoldberg@goldberglawoffice.com.

1 750 ILCS 5/607 (b) (1) and (3).
2 Wickham v. Byrne 2002 Ill. LEXIS 313 (April 18, 2002).
3 Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, (2000)

4 2000 Ill. LEXIS 1694 (October 26, 2000).
5 Chicago Sun-Times, 2000 Census Report, page 6, May 15, 2002
6 750 ILCS 5/607 (b) (1) and (3).
7 66 Ill. 2d 28, 4 Ill. Dec. 313, 360 N.E.2d 60 (1976).
8 Chodzko, 66 Ill. 2d at 34.
9 Chodzko, 66 Ill. 2d at 34-35.
10 Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 40, par. 607(b).
11 Ill.Rev.Stat., 1982 Supp., ch. 40, par. 607(b).
12 Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 40, par. 607(b).
13 Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, par. 607(b).
14 Pub. Act 86-1452, eff. July 1, 1991; Ill.Rev.Stat., 1990 Supp., ch. 40, par. 607(b)
15 the facts of Langman v. Langman, the case that was consolidated with Wickham are not set forth in this article and can be found at 2002 Ill. LEXIS 313 pages 4-8.
16 Wickham v. Byrne 2002 Ill. LEXIS 313, at page 2 (April 18, 2002).
17 Id. at page 3
18 See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315 (a).
19 750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1).
20 Troxel , 530 U.S. at 64, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 58, 120 S. Ct. at 2061, 2062 citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 118, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2504 (1979).

21 In re Smith , 137 Wash.2d 1, 6, 969 P.2d 21, 23-24 (1998); In re Troxel, 87 Wash.App. 131, 133, 940 P.2d 698, 698-699.
22 See 87 Wash.App., at 133-134, 940 P.2d at 699.
23 137 Wash.2d at 6, 969 P.2d, at 23.
24 . In re Smith, 137 Wn. 2d 1, 12, 969 P.2d 21, 26-27 (1998).
25 527 U.S. 1069 (1999).
26 750 ILCS 5/607 allowed only grandparents, great-grandparents and siblings to petition for visitation.
27 See Troxel v. Granville 530 U,.S. at page 67.
28 Id. at page 69 citing Parham v. J.R. 444 U.S. 584, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979).

30 Id. at page 70

32 Troxel 530 U.S. at page 72.
33 Von Eiff vs. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1998).
34 Beagle vs. Beagle, 678 So. 2d. 1271 (Fla. 1996).
35 Herbst vs. Sayre, 1998 WL 725192 (Okla. Sup. Ct. Oct. 13, 1998)
36 Twenty states have restrictive visitation statutes, in which grandparents may petition for visitation only if a disruption in the child’s nuclear family exists, or if harm will occur if visitation is not allowed. The other states have permissive statutes under which the best interest of the child takes priority whether of not there is a disruption in the nuclear family.